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Abstract 
Okasha claims at the outset of Evolution and the Levels of Selection that the Price 
equation lays bare the fundamentals underlying all selection phenomena. 
However, the thoroughness of his subsequent analysis of multi-level selection 
theories leads him to abandon his fundamentalist commitments. At critical points 
he invokes cost benefit analyses that sometimes favors the Price approach and 
sometimes the contextual approach, sometimes favors MLS1 and sometimes 
MLS2. And although he doesn’t acknowledge it, even the Price approach breaks 
down into a family of alternative equations that parse the causes in different ways, 
none of which is uniquely correct and none of which achieves the ultimate 
isolation of effects due to what Okasha believes are the fundamental causes. I 
argue that his book provides good reason to re-conceive our understanding of 
evolutionary theorizing in terms of a toolbox view (developed here) and to stop 
subjecting the analyses of evolutionary concepts to a universalist standard. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† Thanks to Janet McKernan, my colleagues in the Biological Interest Group at MCPS, Samir 
Okasha, Elliott Sober, and Alex Rosenberg. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
2008 Meeting of the PSA and an abridged version of this paper is forthcoming in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. Citations to this paper should include reference to the abridged version, 
which is definitive. 
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Introduction 
Readers might wonder whether philosophical work on the levels of selection 
has run its course, and perhaps it had, but inquiry into the issue has taken on new 
significance in biologists’ theorizing about evolution, and with Samir Okasha’s 
Evolution and the Levels of Selection (hereafter ELS), it will take on new significance 
in the philosophy of science. Okasha rigorously analyzes new developments in 
evolutionary theorizing, and in doing so advances philosophical inquiry on a 
number of issues ranging from the conceptual basics of the theory of natural 
selection to limitations of reductionism. Just as importantly, he also demonstrates 
how inquiry into these philosophical issues can shed light on the new scientific 
developments, including the extension of theorizing to higher scale evolution (e.g. 
species selection) and to evolution through major transitions (e.g. from unicellular 
to multicellular organisms). Recent developments in evolutionary theorizing go 
beyond extending the explanatory scope of multi-level selection; they also include 
the development of formalisms for theorizing about selection, and these 
formalisms have been largely overlooked and left unanalyzed by philosophers. 
One of these formalisms is based on the Price equation, and Okasha uses this 
equation to provide a clear and rigorous analysis of multi-level selection. By 
bringing important scientific developments to the forefront of philosophical 
inquiry, ELS both advances philosophical discussion and brings this discussion to 
bear on some of the most intriguing and important theorizing in contemporary 
biology. I doubt that Okasha will dispute what I have said thus far, but he might 
contest what I take to be his third major accomplishment, an accomplishment 
that unintentionally emerges from a tension at the core of his book. 
The tension arises from Okasha’s efforts to achieve two goals. First, he sets 
out to construct an abstract conceptualization of multi-level selection that can 
provide a unifying, fundamental basis for exploring the multiplicity of 
philosophical issues raised in debates about the levels of selection. Second, he 
seeks extraordinary rigor, which eventually leads him to conduct cost/benefit 
analyses of alternative conceptualizations, which in turn undermines his first goal. 
This tension raises an epistemological question concerning the proper ideal for 
scientific theorizing: should scientists be guided by a commitment to find 
fundamental concepts and principles sufficient for providing a universal and 
unified account of nature, or should theorizing be pragmatic, with scientists 
seeking piecemeal explanations by drawing upon some concepts, principles or 
models to explain some aspects of nature and alternatives to explain other 
aspects? Although Okasha embarks on the fundamentalist mission, his rigorous 
scrutiny often morphs into what I will call ‘toolbox theorizing’.1 Hence, his third 
accomplishment, the unintended one, is to offer a tacit argument for the toolbox 
view. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Similar terminology has been used by others, including Maxwell (manuscript), Cartwright et 
al, (1995), Cartwright (1999), Suárez and Cartwright (2008) and Wimsatt (2007) to cover ideas 
about theorizing similar to those advanced here. 
Abridged version forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Preprint 
Okasha’s Unintended Argument for Toolbox Theorizing 
	   	   3 
1. MLS1 and MLS2  
Okasha’s analysis of biologists’ theorizing about how evolution proceeds 
through major transitions leads him to conclude that one model-type (MLS1) 
accounts for early stages of the process and another model-type (MLS2) accounts 
for later stages. This raises a subtle issue. We might assume that these model-
types represent different “natural kinds” of causal processes. On this view, MLS1 
models some processes, MLS2 others. Given a particular instance of multi-level 
selection, either an MLS1 model, or an MLS2 model, but not both, provides the 
correct causal account. We might say of one token process, ‘this is MLS1’ and of 
another ‘this is MLS2’. But given that evolution is continuous, how does an 
evolutionary process transition from being MLS1 to being MLS2? By leap, or by 
gradual transition? Perhaps intermediate stages are both MLS1 and MLS2. But 
what does this mean? Are there actually two separate processes occurring at once? 
Or is it one process, of which some aspects can be modeled by MLS1 and other 
aspects by MLS2?  
Fundamentalism favors the locutions ‘this instance of selection is an MLS1 
process’, ‘this instance is an MLS2 process’ and ‘this instance includes two 
different processes, an MLS1 process and an MLS2 process’. But toolbox 
theorists would say ‘the first example can be modeled as a MLS1 process, and not 
as an MLS2 process’, ‘the second example can be modeled as a MLS2 process, 
and not as an MLS1 process’, and ‘the third example can be modeled as an MLS1 
process and as an MLS2 process, and depending on your explanatory interests, 
you should use one model, the other model, or both to account for the example.’ 
In short, fundamentalists will declare ‘this is an MLS1 process’ whereas toolbox 
theorists will claim ‘this can be modeled as an MLS1 process’. 
Both fundamentalist and toolbox theorist are realists, but their metaphysical 
pretensions and methodologies differ. While fundamentalists seek the universally 
correct theoretical account for each natural kind of process, regardless of 
explanatory interests about those natural kinds, toolbox theorists seek true theoretical 
accounts that best address particular interests. Okasha often sounds like a 
fundamental theorist, distinguishing natural kinds of processes each of which can 
be comprehensively explained in terms of its fundamentals: 
MLS1 and MLS2 are distinct processes that can occur in nature; 
whether either occurs in a particular case is a matter of objective fact. But 
our explanatory interests may determine which process we wish to model, 
and thus which definition of collective fitness we choose. (p. 59) 
Here, it appears that Okasha is saying that some examples of selection might 
involve two separate (“distinct”) processes, and interests come in at the stage of 
deciding which process to model, not which aspect of the process to model. But 
in the next sentence, he uses the term ‘aspect’ instead of ‘process’: 
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Any conventionalism here is of the innocuous sort that arises because 
all scientific investigations must focus on some aspects of nature at the 
expense of others. (p. 59) 
This sentence evokes the toolbox view according to which theorizing about 
messy parts of the world involves developing a toolbox of theoretical concepts 
and models that can be used to explain different aspects of messy situations. 
(Readers might object that I am drawing too much from Okasha’s language of 
‘aspects’, but my interpretation is supported by the fact that he offers no 
argument for the idea that there are two objectively separate and distinct 
processes. Hence, even if Okasha unambiguously held this idea, he offers no 
argument in favor of it.) 
Fundamentalist and toolbox theorists disagree about the point at which 
interests enter. Fundamentalists assume that the world is made up of natural kinds 
of processes, and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a token 
process and the true model of that process: ‘this particular process of selection 
simply is MLS1’. Toolbox theorists are open to the possibility of a messy world, 
one in which for a given token process, some concepts and models might be 
useful for constructing correct accounts of some aspects of this process, other 
concepts and models might be best for constructing correct accounts of other 
aspects. Okasha does not offer any argument in favor of the fundamentalist 
interpretation of MLS1/MLS2 and it is worth noting that his own description of 
the difference between MLS1 and MLS2 models sounds like toolbox theorizing: 
The key issue is whether the particles [e.g. organisms] or the 
collectives [e.g. groups of organisms] (or both) constitute the ‘focal’ level. 
Are we interested in the frequency of different particle-types in the 
overall population of particles, which so happens to be subdivided into 
collectives? If so, then the particles are the focal units; the collectives are 
in effect part of the environment. Alternatively, we may be interested in 
the collectives as evolving units in their own right, not just as part of the 
particles’ environment. If so, we will wish to track the changing 
frequency of different particle-types and collective-types. Following 
Damuth and Heisler (1988), I refer to the first approach as multi-level 
selection 1 (MLS1), the second as multi-level selection 2 (MLS2). (p. 56) 
 
2. Price versus Contextual Analyses  
Fundamentalist might acknowledge that the toolbox view applies to 
theorizing at the surface, that scientists employ a toolbox of higher-level 
theoretical concepts. They could nevertheless insist that these concepts can 
ultimately be reduced to fundamental concepts that apply universally. On this 
view, it might be misleading to say, ‘this process is MLS1’ (rather than ‘this 
process can be modeled as MLS1’), but it would be perfectly accurate to say ‘this 
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process is natural selection’. This fundamentalist move is consistent with the 
structure of ELS. Okasha begins his book by formulating a highly abstract 
conception of natural selection, which purportedly “lays bare the essential 
components of evolution by natural selection in a highly revealing way.” (p. 19) 
His early analysis is guided by a quest for universal generality, and he repeatedly 
rejects conceptual proposals from the philosophical literature because they are not 
fully general. He argues that since the biological hierarchy (organelles, cells, 
organisms, species, etc.) itself evolved, the fundamental characterization of natural 
selection “cannot refer to highly evolved features, of either organisms or genetic 
systems, on pain of an inevitable loss of generality” (p. 17). This quest for 
universality leads him to Price’s equation, of which he claims “unlike most formal 
descriptions of the evolutionary process, it rests on no contingent biological 
assumptions, so always holds true” (p. 19). At the beginning of his book, Okasha 
claims that the Price formalism “subsumes all more specific models as special 
cases” (p. 3). But there is a tension between this claim and his subsequent 
examination of contextual analysis, an alternative to the Price formalism: 
The tension between contextual analysis and the Price approach arises 
because they constitute non-equivalent ways of partitioning the total 
evolutionary change into components corresponding to each level of 
selection.  (p. 93)  
... 
The Price and contextual partitions are both correct as statistical 
decompositions of the total change, for both of the above equations are 
true; but at most one of them can constitute a correct causal decomposition. 
In other words, presuming there is a ‘fact of the matter’ about how much 
of the total change is attributable to selection at each level, at most one of 
the equations captures that fact. For the two equations will always divide 
up the total change differently; and in certain cases they will disagree about 
whether there is any component of selection at one of the levels. So they 
embody conflicting conceptions of multi-level selection. (p. 94) 
So far, so good for the fundamentalist. The fundamentals of natural selection, 
according to Okasha’s first two chapters, are set out in the Price equation, and 
this equation provides the uniquely correct decomposition of causes for all cases 
of natural selection. Presumably, any alternative decomposition of causes must be 
false. But later in the book, when Okasha carefully examines cases of MLS1 that 
involve cross-level by-products, his meticulous analysis reveals that the situation is 
far messier than the fundamental theorist would like.  
On the one hand, Okasha writes, 
“Contextual analysis seems superior on theoretical grounds. ... 
Moreover, in the case where a particle’s fitness depends only on its own 
character, contextual analysis generates the intuitively correct answer ...” 
(p. 94) 
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On the other hand, 
However, the contextual approach has one implication that some 
theorists find deeply counter-intuitive. ... in the scenario known as ‘soft 
selection’, contextual analysis detects a component of selection at the 
collective level, which is intuitively wrong. (p. 95) 
Okasha explains that this ambivalence arises because “there are two 
requirements that, pre-theoretically, we would like satisfied in order for there to 
be selection at the collective level” and the Price approach satisfies one and 
contextual analysis satisfies the other. He mentions that this might make “some 
sort of conventionalism” sound appealing, but he urges us to resist the 
temptation. 
A brief digression is in order. Discussions of conventionalism often misdirect 
philosophical debate about the levels of selection by equivocating between 
different senses in which a decision might be “conventional”. Reichenbach’s 
(1938) discussion is helpful here. He distinguished among (a) decisions that effect 
the content and truth character of the resulting science; (b) decisions that effect 
the content but not truth character; (c) decisions that effect neither the content 
nor truth character. Philosophical discussions overlook possibility (b), thereby 
imposing a false dichotomy between (a) and (c), and hence a false dichotomy 
between “conventionalism” and realism—e.g. see Lloyd (2005), Sober 
(forthcoming) and Okasha (forthcoming). For further critique of this false 
dichotomizing, see Waters (2005). 
After asking us to resist “conventionalism”, Okasha, concludes: 
“In my view, the contextual approach is on balance preferable, despite 
the violation of the Lewontin conditions that it entails; for the Price 
approach cannot deal satisfactorily with cross-level by-products.” (p. 99)2 
Okasha is suggesting that in the MLS1 model of cross-level by-products, a 
theoretical alternative to the Price equation provides the uniquely correct 
decomposition of causes, if any theory does. This implies that the Price analysis 
provides an incorrect causal decomposition, and leads Okasha to revisit a 
conceptual question from the second chapter (when he was adhering to the 
universalist perspective of a fundamental theorist): 
“If the argument of this section—that the contextual approach to 
MLS1 is superior to the Price approach—is correct, this suggests that [the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Okasha adds, “But the situation is not clear-cut. For as we shall see when we discuss ‘genic 
selection’ in Chapter 5, there are multi-level scenarios of the MLS1 variety which the contextual 
approach cannot satisfactorily handle, but the Price approach can.” Yet further down on the same 
page he says that in one important respect, “the contextual approach provides a representation of 
multi-level selection that is inherently more general.” (p. 99)  
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strict nesting requirement for part–whole relations] is not well-motivated.” 
(p. 99)  
I am not quarrelling with the cost/benefit analysis of cross-level by-products 
that Okasha conducts in Chapter 3. I am pointing out that this analysis differs in 
kind from the fundamentalist analysis he conducted in his first two chapters. 
Moreover, the conclusion he draws about MLS1 models of cross-level by-
products contradicts his earlier claim that the Price equation “subsumes all more 
specific models as special cases” (p. 3). 
 
3. Price Equation 1.2 versus Price Equation 1.3 
It turns out the multiplicity of conceptualizations reaches into the very heart 
of Okasha’s analysis: the Price formalism. Since Okasha explicitly denies this, it is 
necessary to delve into the details. Evolutionary theorists have derived different 
formulations of the Price equation. Okasha scrutinizes two of them, the standard 
formulation and an alternative. The standard formulation is expressed as follows 
(I call this equation ‘1.2’, even though it is the first formula in this paper):   
 ∆
€ 
z   =  Cov (ω, z)  +  Ew(∆z) 1.2 
∆
€ 
z  refers to change in the average value of character z from one generation 
to the next. Cov (ω, z) designates the covariance between fitness values (ω) and 
character values (z) in the parental population. This value is high if fitness and 
character values are highly correlated (e.g. if organisms with higher z values have 
more offspring than do organisms with lower z values). If transmission is perfect, 
that is if offspring inherit the exact z value of their parents, then the covariance of 
fitness and character values would alone determine the change in average z value 
from one generation to the next. But transmission is often biased, that is the z 
value of an offspring often differs from the z value of its parent (following 
Okasha, I assume asexual reproduction3). The second addend on the right-hand 
side (RHS) of equation 1.2, Ew(∆z), concerns the effects of transmission bias, 
which can vary if transmission bias itself is correlated with z value (if transmission 
bias is greater among organisms that produce more offspring [higher w] than 
among organisms that produce fewer offspring, then the overall change in z  [∆
€ 
z ] 
will be less). So Ew(∆z) is the fitness-weighted value of the transmission bias. 
Biologists often interpret equation 1.2 as a decomposition of total evolutionary 
change into the effects due to selection (the first addend on the RHS) and the 
effects due to transmission bias (the second addend). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Okasha makes additional simplifying assumptions which obscure complexities that would 
further undermine his fundamentalist efforts, but space limitations prevent me from substantiating 
this point. 
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But Okasha digs deeper and examines an alternative formulation of the Price 
equation, which he labels ‘1.3’: 
 ∆
€ 
z   =  Cov (ω, z´)  +  E(∆z) 1.3 
Cov (ω, z´) refers to the covariance between fitness values of parents (ω) and 
character values in the offspring (z´). E(∆z) is the un-weighted expected value of 
transmission bias. Equation 1.3 offers an alternative decomposition of the effects 
due to selection [Cov (ω, z´) instead of Cov (ω, z)] and the effects due to 
transmission bias [E(∆z) instead of Ew(∆z)]. 
Okasha then asks: 
Does equation (1.2) or (1.3) provide the correct decomposition of the 
total change? This question is worth thinking about both for its intrinsic 
interest and because the same type of question will arise again in later 
chapters...Equations (1.2) and (1.3) both provide correct statistical 
decompositions of ∆ , for both equations hold true by definition, but it 
still makes sense to ask which if either provides the correct causal 
decomposition. 
Notice that Okasha writes ‘the correct’ [my emphasis]. From the perspective of 
fundamental theorizing, the goal is to identify the equation that correctly 
decomposes the ultimate causes. But, as Okasha readily admits, it is not always 
possible to decompose the effects of different causes:  
In general, causal decomposition is only possible where the causal 
factors make ‘separable’ contributions to the overall effect...This will not 
always be the case. To borrow an example of Sober’s, an individual’s 
height is affected by both their genes and their nutritional intake, but we 
cannot ask how many centimetres are due to genes and how many to 
nutrition; this question makes no sense (Sober 1988). By contrast, in 
classical mechanics, if an object is acted on by two or more physical 
forces, then the overall effect, that is, the net acceleration, can be 
decomposed into components corresponding to each force, using 
standard vector analysis. So causal decomposition is sometimes but not 
always possible. (p. 27). 
He continues: 
It is common in biology to regard the total evolutionary change in a 
population as the net result of a number of different causal factors or 
‘forces’, of which natural selection is one...Others include migration, drift, 
and transmission bias. This raises the question: is causal decomposition 
possible in this case? Can the total evolutionary change be divided into 
distinct components, each corresponding to a different causal factor? (pp. 
27–8) 
! 
z 
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The question of whether causes can be decomposed is indeed an empirical 
one. But five critical points are in order. First, Okasha’s discussion equivocates 
between causes and effects of causes. Second, the pertinent issue, as Okasha himself 
sets out (pp. 25–6), is whether the addends of a Price equation separates change 
“due to” natural selection from change “due to” transmission bias. Third, Sober’s 
height example is irrelevant because selection involves actual difference making. It 
is not z (the value of a single individual), or  (the average value of z in a 
generation) being explained by natural selection; rather it is ∆ , the difference in 
average value of z from one generation to the next that is being explained. 
Although it makes no sense to ask how many centimeters of an individual’s height 
are due to genes and how many are due to nutrition, it can make sense to ask 
whether a difference in height between two individuals is due to differences in 
their genes, differences in their nutrition, or both. Likewise, although it makes no 
sense to ask how many centimeters of the offspring’s average height are due to 
genes and how many are due to nutrition, it can make sense to ask how much of a 
difference between the average height of parents and the average height of their 
offspring is due to differences in genes and how much is due to differences in 
nutrition. E.g. if parents and offspring are genetically identical, but offspring are 
taller than parents due to superior nutrition, then all the actual difference in height is 
due to differences in nutrition—see Waters (2007) for discussion of actual difference 
making. Fourth, Okasha does not consider the possibility that the effects of two 
causes might be partially, though not completely, decomposable. Finally, Okasha’s 
discussion on pages 27–8 overlooks the difference between ‘causal interactionism’ 
and ‘statistical interaction’. Standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) provides 
partial causal decompositions by incorporating an additional addend that 
designates the effects due to the statistical interaction of distinct causes.4  
Contrary to what Okasha’s discussion might suggest, what determines 
whether the effects of different causes can be completely decomposed is not 
whether the causes interact in a process, but whether differences in each of the 
respective causes bring about uniform differences in the value of the effect 
variable regardless of the actual values of other causes. The pertinent question 
about whether the effects of selection and transmission bias can be completely 
decomposed concerns whether differences in fitness values will have the same 
effect on evolutionary change regardless of the degree of transmission bias (and 
vice versa). And the answer is unequivocally no.5 In equation 1.2, the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This point is essential for understanding of the analysis of variance (ANOVA). A critical 
distinction, which Okasha’s discussion on pages 27–8 overlooks, involves the difference between 
‘causal interactionism’ and ‘statistical interaction’. ANOVA provides partial causal decompositions 
by incorporating an addend that designates the effects due to the statistical interaction of distinct 
causes. See Tabery (2008) for an illuminating	  discussion of the concept of statistical interaction 
and Sesardic (2005) for	  a discussion of the difference between causal interactionism and statistical 
interaction. 
5 Okasha (forthcoming) disagrees. But even if it turned out that statistical interaction is equal 
to zero, this would be a contingent result of evolution. Hence, Okasha’s claim that the Price 
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fitness makes is clearly dependent on the value of transmission bias (since the 
second addend is weighted by fitness). In equation 1.3, the difference fitness 
makes is also dependent on the value of transmission bias because the first 
addend involves a covariance between the fitness of parents and the trait value of 
their offspring, the latter of which will depend on the value of transmission bias. 
Both equations show that the same differences in fitness values will have different 
effects depending on the value of transmission bias. Hence, neither equation 
separates differences due to selection from differences due to transmission bias.  
Okasha, however, reaches a different conclusion. He argues that equation 1.3 
provides “the correct” causal decomposition and that equation 1.2 does not. How 
does he reach this conclusion? He begins by asking, ‘which equation sequesters 
into one addend what would happen if selection were reduced to zero?’ He 
answers that the effect of eliminating selection is limited to the first addend of 
equation 1.3, but is distributed across both addends in 1.2. One problem with his 
argument for this answer is that it crucially depends on metaphysical speculations 
about which of two modifications would produce counterfactual scenarios most 
similar to an actual selection situation: (a) the scenario generated by equalizing the 
fitnesses of all entities but leaving “everything else” unchanged (presumably the 
environment would need to be changed to equalize fitness); (b) the scenario 
generated by equalizing character values, but leaving everything else, including 
differential reproductive success unchanged (presumably differences in 
reproductive success would be due to chance).  
The difference in outcome brought about by reducing the effects of natural 
selection the first way (a) is isolated in the first addend in equation 1.3 and 
distributed across both addends in equation 1.2. But the difference in outcome 
brought about by reducing the effects of natural selection to zero in the second 
way (b) is isolated in the first addend in equation 1.2 and distributed across both 
addends in equation 1.3. Okasha believes that the second scenario is “quite 
remote from the actual world” and concludes that therefore equation 1.3, not 
equation 1.2 provides “the correct causal decomposition of ∆
€ 
z ” (p. 30). I suspect 
Okasha’s intuition about the remoteness of these counterfactual scenarios from 
“the actual world”, rests not on a pipeline to metaphysical truth, but on tacit 
considerations about practicalities (it is easier to manipulate the actual world to 
produce situations of the first type (as evidenced by artificial selection) than 
scenarios of the second type. But there is a there is a separate problem with his 
argument. 
Okasha assumes that the uniquely correct parsing is achieved by whichever 
equation provides a single addend answer to the question “what would happen if 
the effects of natural selection were entirely eliminated”. But what if we asked 
instead “what would happen if natural selection was reduced somewhat or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
formalism “rests on no contingent biological assumptions” (p. 19) is compromised in that it 
cannot completely decompose selection and transmission bias in a principled way.	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increased somewhat? Would the differences still be isolated into a single addend?” 
Or, what if we asked, “what if transmission bias were increased or decreased, or 
eliminated altogether? Which equation would sequester the change in outcome 
due to changing transmission bias?” Consider the question, “what if transmission 
bias were decreased, would the difference in effect be isolated in a single addend 
(on the RHS) of one of the equations?” The answer, if we follow a line of 
reasoning parallel to Okasha’s, is yes, but this time it is isolated in a single addend 
of equation 1.2, and not in a single addend of equation 1.3.  
So which equation gives “the correct causal decomposition” of the effects of 
fitness and transmission bias in cases of selection? There is no answer. One 
equation does a better job of isolating the effects of eliminating selection 
(granting Okasha’s metaphysical hunches), the other does a better job of isolating 
the effects due to differences in transmission bias. The process of evolution by 
selection involves the causal and statistical interaction of fitness and transmission 
bias. Okasha’s quest for the uniquely correct formal framework for decomposing 
these causes cannot accomplish the task even in the simplest cases.  
I suggest that we think of the different formulations of the Price equations as 
tools in a box that can be drawn upon to answer different questions. If biologists 
want to know what would happen if selection were eliminated by changing the 
environment, then equation 1.3 provides a cleaner parsing of causes (cleaner but 
not perfect). If they want to know what would happen if transmission bias were 
increased, then equation 1.2 provides a cleaner parsing. There is no uniquely 
correct and exhaustive decomposition of the effects of different causes on 
evolutionary change. There is no decomposition of fundamental causes that cuts 
nature at its joints.6  Although neither 1.2 nor 1.3 provides the complete parsing 
that Okasha seeks, each provides informative partial causal decompositions. 
Depending on what question one asks, one partial decomposition might provide a 
cleaner parsing of causes than the other. It would be a mistake for theorists to 
anoint one equation as fundamentally correct and the other as mistaken. Both 
equations belong in the theoreticians’ toolbox.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In his reply (Okasha forthcoming), Okasha argues that the equation generated by adding a 
third addend for statistical interaction does give a complete decomposition. Following Okasha, I 
will call this equation ‘1.4’. But 1.4 does not completely parse what he takes to be the fundamental 
causes, selection and transmission bias. What it parses are the additive effects of selection, the 
additive effects of transmission bias, and the non-additive effects of selection and transmission bias. 
So, his suggestion that this three way parsing cuts nature at its joints by completely isolating the 
effects of individual fundamental causes is not accurate. Moreover, it is unclear why one parsing 
of effects into additive and non-additive addends (1.4) is the uniquely “correct“ causal 
decomposition whereas other parsings of effects into additive and non-additive addends (e.g. 1.2 
or 1.3) must be incorrect. Once Okasha admits that there is no way to completely decompose 
effects into additive components without making empirical assumptions concerning what 
evolution has produced (ecological niches and transmission systems that do not give rise to 
statistical interaction between selection and transmission bias), he has sold the fundamentalist 
farm.	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4. Conclusion 
Although Okasha claims at the outset that the Price equation lays bare the 
fundamentals underlying all selection phenomena, the rigor of his subsequent 
analysis and thoroughness of his probing leads him to abandon his fundamentalist 
commitments. At critical points he invokes cost benefit analyses that sometimes 
favor the Price approach and sometimes the contextual approach, sometimes 
favor MLS1 and sometimes MLS2. And although he doesn’t acknowledge it, even 
the Price approach breaks down into a family of alternative equations that parse 
the causes in different ways, none of which is uniquely correct and none of which 
achieves the ultimate isolation of effects due to what Okasha believes are the 
fundamental causes. While I doubt that Okasha will agree, his work provides 
good reason to re-conceive our understanding of evolutionary theorizing in terms 
of the toolbox view and to stop subjecting the analyses of scientific concepts to 
the universalist standard. 
The fundamentalist and toolbox views can be summarized as follows: 
1. Fundamentalist view: the aim of scientific theorizing is to identify 
the fundamental causal relationships that are universally responsible for a 
domain of processes. Achieving this aim entails articulating the 
fundamental theoretical concepts and causal principles that can provide a 
basis for constructing models that decompose the fundamental causes of 
each and every process in the uniquely correct way. Proponents of this 
view stress the idea that there is, of course, just one way the world actually 
is, and the aim of theorizing is to describe, in a principled manner, the one 
way it actually is. 
2. Toolbox view: the aim of scientific theorizing is to construct causal 
models that explain aspects of the processes in the domain and that 
provide a basis for manipulation those processes. Achieving this aim 
entails articulating a multiplicity of theoretical concepts and causal 
principles that can be drawn upon to construct models that might 
decompose the causes of some processes in a multiplicity of ways. In such 
cases, some concepts and models offer the best account of some aspects 
of the given process, others provide the best account of other aspects.  
The toolbox view does not deny that there is just one way the world actually 
is; it merely denies the fundamentalist assumption that there must be a single way 
to formulate the basic concepts and principles that provides the uniquely correct 
and comprehensive account of the world.  
Many philosophers are committed to the fundamentalist view of scientific 
theorizing. But why should we be committed to fundamentalism (or toolbox 
theorizing) a priori? Why not leave the question open to empirical considerations? 
Instead of proceeding from a priori metaphysics (‘there must be a fundamental 
description’), why not proceed from empirically informed epistemology? Perhaps, 
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given the messiness of the world the ideal theory turns out to be more like a 
toolbox than a fundamental theory. Different tools in the box might be employed 
to account for different aspects of the causal complexity. Perhaps what 
philosophers have assumed is a single concept, such as fitness, consists of a family 
of somewhat different concepts each useful for theorizing about somewhat 
different aspects, parts, or scales of entangled evolutionary processes.7 Why assume 
that there must be some single way to decompose evolutionary causes that will 
suffice to answer all causal questions about evolution? Fundamentalists might 
answer this question with one of their own: ‘why not assume that there must be a 
single way?’ The answer to this question can be found in the results of Okasha’s 
meticulous analysis. 
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